Quarterly Synopsis of Florida Cases by unknown
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 3 Number 1 Article 6 
12-1-1948 
Quarterly Synopsis of Florida Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Quarterly Synopsis of Florida Cases, 3 U. Miami L. Rev. 40 (1948) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol3/iss1/6 
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




Continuing a feature begun in the last issue of the Miami Law Quar-
terly,' there is presented herewith a brief summary of the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Florida published during the last quarter.2 Because this
issue goes to press within a month of the previous one, the quarter has been
arbitrarily reduced by thirty days, and the total number of cases reviewed is
further reduced by the fact that the summer vacation period is reflected in the
cases published during this period. The principal objective of this comment is
to present the business of the court as a whole. The remarks on the individual
cases are only preliminary surveys, many of which will be extended in the
present or future issues.
PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Retrospective legislation. Accrued or vested rights
are protected under the state and federal constitutions by several provisions.
To abolish or modify such a right may be a taking of property without due
process of law, the impairment of the obligation of a contract, or the per-
formance of judicial functions, ultra vires, by the legislature. With respect to
individual liberty, there is additional protection in the clauses prohibiting ex
post facto laws. The protection of accrued rights is qualified, however, by the
rule that in the exercise of its police power, or the power of eminent domain,
the state may abridge them. A cause of iction which has accrued is entitled
to this qualified privilege, while one which has not accrued is generally not
protected. The provision3 of the Florida Constitution which declares that
every person shall have remedy for any injury done him, does not change
the general rule in this respect. The point is illustrated by a current case
4
upholding a statute5 which abolished the cause of action for alienation of
affections. The statute did not terminate existing causes, but shortened the
period of limitations. It was argued that the marriage contract was impaired;
but the court indicated that marriage is a contract which creates a status, not
an executory contract. It was also argued that the right of a husband in the
consortium and affections of his wife is property, but this was rejected.
1. 2 MIAMI L. Q. 305 (1948).
2. This comwetit covers the decisions appearing in the advance sheets from September
2 to and including October 28, 1948; 36 So. 2d 393 through 896.
3. FLA. CoNsT. DECLARATION or RrcrTS, § 4.
4. Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1948).
5. Fla. Laws 1945, c. 23138; F. S. A. § 771.01 (1945).
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Criminal statutes punishing habitual offenders may be unconstituiional 'as
ex post facto laws if they permit punishment for an offense or offenses which
occurred before their passage, but statutes construed as increasing the punish-
ment for a recent offense when the offender has been previously convicted,
have been approved. The court was presented ' with decisions illustrating this
principle in a case where a prisoner, erroneously sentenced tinder a fourth
offense statute, was released on habeas corpus, and was immediately prose-
cuted by a new information under a second offense statute, The force of the
argument amounted to this, that in interpreting the statute, the court must
presume that the legislature would not have intended to make the conviction of
the several offenses a separate crime, which would be unconstitutional, but the
court found an alternative basis for its decision. The prohibition on retro-
spective laws does not protect the state, however. This principle was illustrated
in a recent case7 where the legislature, having authorized a license tax on
stamp vending machines, among others, subsequently exempted them.
Due process. The right of a husband to the consortium and affections of
his wife is not property, but if it were, it is indicated " that the power of the
legislature over marriage is plenary. This is not to be regarded as a decision
that the legislature may grant divorces or annul specific marriages, as this
would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers; but in the
absence of a- specific limitation, it may be inferred that the legislature may
withdraw the common-law protections which promote morality and sanctify
the marital relationship. It may also be inferred, from the handling of Illinois
precedents,9 that due process clause is no limitation.
The clauses of the Florida Constitution which provide that every person
for any injury done him, shall have remedy, 10 that all persons are equal before
the law and have certain inalienable rights," and that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' 2 are the
substantial equivalent of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
Federal system. Limitations on the power of a state are implied from
its position in the federal system into which the United States is organized.
Because of this, a state may not impede by taxation the exercise of federal
governmental functions..A curious parallel with the leading case of McCulloch
s,. Maryland 13 was presented in a case"4 challenging a state statute which per-
6. State v. Nelson, 36 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1948).
7. Harrell v. Schelernan, 36 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1948).
8. Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1948).
9. See Heck v. Schupp, 394 IMI. 296, 68 N. E. 2d 464 (1946) ; see Note, 167 A. L. R. 232
(1947).
10. FLA, CONST. DFCLARATION OF RIGHTS; § 4.
11. FLA. CoNs'r. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 1.
12. FLA. CONeST. DECLARATION OF Ri(;ITS, § 12.
13. 4 Wheat. 316 (M. S. 1819).
14. Harrell v. Scheleman, 36 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1948).
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mitted a license tax to be levied on postage stamp vending machines; but the
court did not recognize it.
Full faith and credit. The provisions of the federal constitution requiring
full faith and credit t6 be given to the judicial proceedings of other states, and
the Acts of Congress implementing these provisions, do not require courts
to take action upon the judgment of another state which is not final where
rendered. Whether or not a decree is final is a matter determined by the law
of the state where rendered. In Florida, where judicial notice is not taken of
the law of other states, this is a fact to be proved as such, and where a declara-
tion upon a foreign judgment alleges that it is final, this may not be chal-
lenged on demurrer, Even where there is a decision of the United States
Supreme Court on the finality of the judgment, it seems -that this is not con-
trolling, because the settled rule is that the full faith and credit clause does not
require the courts of a state to decide correctly what the law of the other
state is.1r
Double jeopardy. The provisions of the state constitution protecting an
accused from subjection to double jeopardy were construed in a case" where
the accused caused two deaths in a single traffic accident. After acquittal of
criminal responsibility in the death of one victim, he was indicted for the
death of the other. In the first case, the charge was manslaughter for culpable
negligence; in the second, manslaughter for driving while drunk. This is the
first time that a Florida case decided that two separate crimes are committed
when there are two separate victims, although the point is often assumed.'7
The court, although it was not required to do so, expressed the view that two
separate offenses were charged, and that the double jeopardy clause would be
no defense if there had been only one victim.
Right to bail. The provisions'8 of the state constitution requiring the
accused to be admitted to bail in criminal cases, make a qualified exception in
capital cases, under which the court is required to determine whether, as a
matter of fact, the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great. The
fact that the grand jury has indicted does not preclude the question. A recent
decision,' holding that the circuit court erred in denying habeas corpus, illus-
trates this rule. The case is not one of first instance. Because the court failed
to summarize the evidence, the opinion is wasted.
ADrMINISTRATIVE LAW. Declaratory Judgment, The use of declaratory
judgment procedure to review or control acts of administrative agencies, was
exemplified in a current case.20 It is not necessary to show that the remedy at
law or in equity is inadequate before the court can take jurisdiction. A
15. Collins v. Collins, 36 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1948).
16. McHugh v. State, 36 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1948).
17. See 1 MIAMI L. Q. 44 (1947).
18. FLA. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 9.
19. State ex rel. Connor v. Sullivan, 36 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1948).
20. Miller v. Doss, 36 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1948).
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demurrer based on the contention that there was such a remedy, presumably
by mandamus or injunction, was overruled. Because of certain technicalities
defining the scope of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and the other extraor-
dinary common-law writs, one may expect declaratory judgment procedure to
supplant the older forms. In this lies danger of overlooking the fact that
some of the technicalities limiting use of the extraordinary writs are based
upon constitutional limits on the judicial power. The court may not direct the
performance of legislative acts or executive acts which involve discretion, for
example, and it can act only upon a case or controversy. The case holds that a
taxpayer has standing in court to challenge unlawful exemptions.
Licenses. In a case2 l involving an application for reinstatement by a dis-
barred attorney, the court restated the principles upon which reinstatement
may be granted. The case furnishes an interesting comparison with the Paoli
case, 22 which held that all licenses, once granted, are property, and may not
be revoked except for cause and in accordance with due process of law. The
language suggests that there is a right of reinstatement, not a mere privilege,
and that the burden of proving that the applicant has not been rehabilitated or
adequately punished is on the prosecution (but the holding is otherwise).
The case is oide of original jurisdiction in which the court is not acting in a
judicial capacity, but in a matter of internal administration where it asserts
plenary authority.
TAXATION. The provisions of an act 23 of the last legislature exempting
postage stamp vending machines from taxation are not retroactive.2 4 A tax-
payer 'hay by declaratory judgment proceedings challenge unlawful exemp-
tions granted by a county tax assessor.
25
CRIMTNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. Motion for new trial. Where matters
not appearing in the record are alleged to result in denial of a fair trial, they
may be raised on motion for a new trial. Findings of fact made by the trial
judge thereon, if supported by evidence, are conclusive. This rule was illus-
trated in a current case26 Where it was alleged that a juror was related to a
witness for the state and the sheriff attended the jury during deliberations
after testifying for the state. The holding indicates that it is a question of fact,
not law, whether or not the rights of the accused were prejudiced. The court
reviewed the evidence and found it sufficient to support the trial judge's find-
ings ; but since the court did not summarize the evidence, the case is valueless
as a precedent.
Motive. It is not necessary to prove the existence of motive in a prosecu-
21. In re Stoller, 36 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1948).
22. State ex rel Paoli v. Baldwin, 31 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1947). See Notes, 2 MIAMT
L. Q. 54 (1948) : I U. or FLA. L. Rrv. 296 (1948).
23. Fla. l.aws 1947. c. 23740: F. S. A. §205.63-1 (1947).
24. Harrell v. Scheleman, 36 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1948)
25. Miller v. Doss. 36 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1948).
26. Berry v. State, 36 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1948).
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tion for murder; but where the evidence is circumstantial only, proof of
motive is material to implicate the accused. The distinction between necessity
and materiality is often overlooked, and this is apparent in a recent case 27
where the court found that, since the evidence showed that the crime was
committed in response to sexual impulses, no more specific evidence of motive
was required.
Confessions. Requiring an accused to submit to physical examination may
in effect compel him to give testimony against himself. Whether or not the
findings are admissible does not turn on the common-law rule excluding con-
fessions, which seems to have been based on the theory that the accused will
falsify if induced by promise or threat; for the accused cannot falsify the
physical evidence. Objection if any must be fotnd in the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. 2 s To find that accused has waived this
privilege when he does not object to an examination preceding trial, when he
is without counsel, is a recognition of the distinction. 29
Circu, stantial evidence. Where the accused, discovered near the scene
of a murder, bloody and disheveled, told of having surprised an unidentified
assailant in the commission of the crime, and accounted for his condition by
stating that lie intervened, 30 inconsistencies and improbabilities in his story
are circumstantial evidence tending to prove his guilt.
PRIVATE LAW
TORTS. Alienation of affectiois. A statute abolishing the common-la%%
action for alienation of the affections of a wife has been sustained against
attack on its constitutionality. 3' Deceit. An action in deceit is based upon
fraudulent misrepresentations of fact. Generally, it cannot be maintained by
a purchaser against a seller because of the rule of caveat emptor, and if the
statement is one of law, not of fact, there can be no recovery. This rule was
illustrated in a case 2 nonsuiting a lessee where it was shown that lessor mis-
represented the fact that the premises were zoned for the purpose for which
leased. Contributory negligence. The rule that it is negligence per se to fail
to look and listen before entering a railroad crossing, has been adopted in a
current case.33 No doubt it must be shown that the view was unobstructed
and that failure to stop was a contributing cause. Where the plaintiff testified
that he did not look before entering the crossing, the court reversed a judg-
ment in his favor.
CONTRACTS. Failure of Consideration. Where parties enter into a lease iv
27. Snpra.
28. FLA. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIHTS, § 12.
29. See note 26 supra.
30. See note 26 supra.
31. Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So. 2d 419 (Fla, 1948).
32. Marks v. Fields, 36 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1948)..
33. Atlantic Coast Line v. Tininons. 36 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 948
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the mistaken belief, fraudulently induced or otherwise, that zoning ordinances
permit the use of the premises for the purpose for which the lease is made,
the lessee may recover rent paid in an action for money had and received. 4
This decision fails to make the usual distinction between executory contracts
and sales or conveyances. Where title has passed, the remedy is for rescission,
not failure of consideration. Furthermore, the rule of caveat emptor applies
in sales and leases. While this has been modified somewhat in sales of chattels
Where the sale is made for an express purpose and the buyer reasonably relies
on the seller's skill and judgment, there has heretofore been found no implied
warranty in leases. In the instant case, the distinction was important, because
if it was necessary to proceed on *Ae theory of rescission, the plaintiff
should have been bound by an election. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
White appears to be the more orthodox.
Where title to personal property has passed under a contract of sale,
the seller may rescind for fraud and recover the property. If he has lost his
seller's lien by delivery of the property to the purchaser, an action is necessary
for this purpose. While equitable principles govern, the action is one in law of
trover or replevin. The existence of such a remedy precludes jurisdiction in
equity; but the right, being equitable, may be lost if the chattel is meanwhile
conveyed to a purchaser for value without notice, Where the purchaser does
not pay value, but takes for a past consideration, under equitable considera-
tions he may be reduced to the position of a mere lienor. In the illustrative
case,35 one Spurlock purchased an automobile from Thompson, giving a
worthless check and an automobile belonging to a friend, Guntner, in pay-
ment. Prior to conviction of uttering the worthless check, he turned the new
automobile over to Guntner, apparently in repayment for the old car fur-
nished in trade. The new car was worth $2500; the old, after incumbrances,
$100. Most unfortunately, the opinion gives no clear statement of the effect of
the evidence on this point, and it can only be inferred from the conclusion
that this must have been the case. Thompson replevied the automobile; Gunt-
ier claimed title, and obtained a favorable verdict below. The Supreme Court
reversed, indicating that Gunther was not a purchaser for value, but a secured
creditor to the extent of the value of the car taken in trade.
Damages for taking of persoalty. The case last cited also illustrates the
rule that while damages for a taking of personal property are value at time and
place of conversion, inl an action for specific restitution, the possessor may not
claim a lien for any increase in value not resulting from work and labor in-
nocently performed. Thus, an answer, setting forth that whereas the auto-
mobile was worth only $2500 when sold, it was worth $3000 at the time of
repossession, presumably because of inflation, was stricken on demurrer.
34. Marks v. Fields, 36 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1948).
35. Thompson v. Guntner, 36 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1948).
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EQUfTY. Trade names and unfair competition. As a general rule, equity
will enjoin interference with trade names, or unfair competition; but tile rule
appears to be otherwise in Florida. A bill alleging that the defendant was about
to enter into business in competition with the plaintiff using a deceptively
similar name, was dismissed for want of equity. On appeal, the order was
affirmed per curiam, Barnes. J., dissenting.6 Whether the basis of dismissal
was that the remedy at law (this also constitutes a tort) is adequate, or that
the name was not in law deceptively similar, or that the action was premature,
is conjectural, the authorities cited giving little help. In a matter of such im-
portance, without apparent Florida precedent except another per cutrioz
opinion, a full discussion would have been helpful.
Specific per formance. Specific performance of a contract, otherwise per-
nissible in equity, may not be enforced where the contract is indefinite or
runs for an indeterminate period, but a contract to run for twenty years
certain is enforceable for that period.
3 7
Constructive trusts. The constructive trust is a device whereby equity,
acting in personam, may effectively transfer title to property from a tortious
holder thereof to its proper owner; but unless a decree directs a transfer of
property or declares a trust, it cannot be construed as affecting title to property.
This rule was illustrated in a case where the master in a dki'orce case found
that certain bonds owned by the husband belonged to the husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety. The chancellor's decree made no mention of the bonds.
The husband's appeal was dismissed.38
REAL PROPERTY. Co-owners. A fiduciary relationship exists between con-
current owners of real property, whether they be classified as tenants in com-
mon, coparceners, or joint tenants. Consequently, one cannot acquire title at
a tax sale and hold thereunder adversely to the others, although he may retain
a lien for contrilbution. His possession being that of all, he cannot hold ad-
versely. in a current case, 30 real property, homestead of a father, descended
on his death to his children, subject to a life estate in the wife. A third person
secured a tax title to the land for taxes liened during the father's life, and
subsequently quitclaimed to a son who owned adjoining property. On death of
the mother, the son took possession, and subsequently brought a bill to quiet
title. The Supreme Court reversed a judgment for plaintiff and directed the
bill to be dismissed.
Covenants running with the land. A covenant made between grantor and
grantee which concerns the use and enjoyment of land conveyed, may run
with the land and be enforceable against a remote grantee. The question
36. Consumers' Finance Co. v. Consumers' Loan Service, Inc., 36 So. 2d 443 (Fla.
1948).
37. Wilson v. Wakulla Edgewater Co., 36 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1948).
38. Brunner v. Brunner, 36 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1948).
39. Spencer v. Spencer, 36 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1948).
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whether a contract to purchase water from a particular source runs with the
land, and can be enforced against a purchaser of the premises who has notice
thereof, was presented during the quarter.40 The grantor, developing a piece
of unimproved property, conveyed a portion of his land to plaintiff, who
agreed to furnish water for twenty years, and erected a tank and dug a well
on the land conveyed. The court assumed the point without much discussion,
but the point is by no means well settled.
Damages for injuries to land. Where real property is injured by cutting
trees, the owner may recover the value of the timber in an action for wrong-
ful conversion or he may recover for injury to the land. In the latter case,
the measure of damages is the dimunition in value of the land caused by the
removal of the timber. Where the land has been acquired for or developed
for a particular purpose, the measure of value is not general market value,
but value to the owner. The point was illustrated in a current case where
defendant cut timber on land which plaintiff had acquired for use as a trailer
park. Timbered acreage in the vicinity was worth much less than land suited
to this purpose.
ADj ECTIVAL LAW
EVIDENCE. A decision 41 to the effect that Florida courts do not notice
judicially the law of other states is discussed above under Constitutional Law:
Full Faith and Credit. A case 42 dealing with confessions, circumstantial evi-
dence, and evidence of motive is discussed above under Criminal Law: Con-
fessioRs. The opinion of a bar association that a disbarred attorney was not
rehabilitated, was treated in a reinstatement case 42 as a conclusion of law
rather than factual evidence. It would seem that the opinion of such a
group is entitled to weight as an expression of the opinion of experts on
the professional qualifications of one of their number. The point should be
further developed.
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. Master's fees. A decision reducing the fee
of a master in a contested divorce case from $2500 to $1200 should be com-
pared with a case, disapproving a fee in excess of the statutory limit, dis-
cussed in the last issue.44 Disqualification of judge. The fact that a judge, in
seeking election, has made certain statements indicative of prejudice, may not
disqualify him in a case arising seven or eight years later; but the question
must be raised before trial or the objection is waived. A heated colloquy took
place between the judge and counsel during trial; this fact does not as a
40. Wilson v. Wakulla Edgewater Co., 36 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1948).
41. Collins v. Collins. 36 So. 24 417 (Fla. 1948).
42. Berry v. State, 36 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1948).
43. In re Stoller, 36 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1948).
44. Robbins v. Robbins, 36 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1948). Cf. Cohn v. Cohn, 36 So. 2d 199
(Fla. 1948), discussed 2 MIAMI L. Q. 336 (1948).
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matter of law disqualify him from adjudicating the client's rights.45 This rule
would, of course, not qualify a judge where it is shown, as a matter of fact,
that he is incapable of rendering a fair decision.
Disbarment and readurission. A disbarred attorney who has been re-
habilitated and whose punishment has been adequate, may be reinstated. A
recent case, 46 granting readmission, is not a holding that this is a matter of
right, but a privilege which may be peremptorily denied. This case, being one
of internal administration, in which the supreme court exercised original
jurisdiction, contains language which might be construed otherwise if this
fact is not borne in mind.
PRACTICE. Appellate use of habeas corpus. Virtually all cases decided dur-
ing this quarter involve rulings on matters of procedure: but only three hiMve
been selected for notice because of novelty. When the writ of habeas corpus
is used to challenge judicial proceedings, it may be used as the basis for col-
lateral attack, as upon the jurisdiction of the court, being substantially the
equivalent of prohibition; but it may also be a direct attack, to review errors of
law after the time for appeal has expired, in which case it is the equivalent of a
writ of certiorari, or a writ of error crarm nobis. In the former case, the
effect of the grant of the writ is to hold that the proceedings were coram non
judice, and new proceedings may be begun before a proper tribunal. In the
latter case, can the court remand or retain the case for further proceedings?
The question was raised, and answered affirmatively, in a case decided during
the quarter.47 The applicant had been convicted erroneously as a fourth
offender, when in fact he was only a second offender. After granting habeas
corpus, the trial court on a new information entertained jurisdiction td correct
the sentence. The court held that the correct sentence might be entered nunc pro
tune under the statute.
Amendnient during trial. A remarkable case in which the plaintiff suf-
fered nonsuit in a tort action, brought a new action in contract, and the de-
fendant demurred and amended his pleas, all after the evidence was in and
before the jury retired, so that the same case continued to verdict and judg-
ment on the new theory, was reviewed 18 during the quarter. The defendant,
obviously taken by surprise, failed to ask for a continuance, and was held to
have waived his right to object to this streamlined procedure. The conduct of
the trial judge, and the willingness of the appellate court to brush aside dila-
tory technicalities, are commendable.
Grat of new trial. The power of a trial court to grant a new trial where
there is conflicting testimony, appears to have been limited in a recent case, 4
45. State ex rel. Fuente v. Himes, 36 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1948).
46. In re Stoller, 36 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1948).
47. State v. Nelson, 36 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1948).
48. Marks v. Fields, 36 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1948).
49. Urga v. State, 36 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1948).
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holding that where there is abundant testimony to support a verdict, it is error
for the trial court to grant a new trial. While weight and sufficiency of the
evidence are questions for the jury, it has generally been held that a judge
who disagrees with the verdict may grant a new trial, and the decision appears
to create a precedent.
